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Comments on Swift and Slobogin: 
Mental State Evidence 
Paul Rothstein∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Excellent, thought-provoking articles have the capacity to inspire 
readers to take up their own pens or computers.  The Articles pub-
lished in the Guilt vs. Guiltiness Symposium of the Seton Hall Law Re-
 ∗ Professor of Law, Georgetown University, specializing in Evidence and other 
subjects of civil, criminal, and constitutional judicial process.  His publications (alone 
or with co-authors) include the books FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (3d ed. 2008), 
FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES (2d ed. 2007–08), EVIDENCE: CASES, MATERIALS & 
PROBLEMS (3d ed. 2006), EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL (5th ed. 2007), numerous articles, 
and briefs in cases including Upjohn and Daubert in the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  A former Oxford University Fulbright Scholar, Law Review Editor-in-Chief, 
Public Defender, and trial practitioner, he has been special counsel and advisor to 
the Judiciary Committees of both Houses of Congress (on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the Federal Crime Victims Compensation Act, the Federal Criminal Code, 
and sentencing reform), the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (on the Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act and the Uniform Rules 
of Evidence), the National Academy of Sciences (on voiceprint evidence, and airport 
automated searches), the Federal Judicial Center (training federal judges, particu-
larly on Daubert issues and contributing to the Center’s Scientific Evidence Manual), 
the National Judicial College (training state judges), Rand, Carnegie, Brookings, and 
the American Enterprise Institute (on mass civil lawsuits, science in court, and 
Daubert), the U.S. Department of Justice (training Justice Department trial attor-
neys), and, on constitutional, judicial, and criminal law reform, the Governments of, 
among others, Canada, the Philippines, and many of the nations emerging from the 
former Soviet Union, including Russia, whose current constitution he helped draft.  
Professor Rothstein has also advised or assisted several U.S. state governments, fed-
eral agencies (inter alia training Federal Trade Commission trial attorneys), bar as-
sociations, and several of the nation’s principal law firms on evidentiary and related 
matters.  He has held positions in the American Bar Association (Criminal Justice 
Section) and Federal Bar Association and chaired the Association of American Law 
Schools Evidence Section and an American Bar Association committee monitoring 
developments under the Federal and Uniform Rules of Evidence, suggesting changes 
to the Rules, a number of which have been made.  His series of nationwide confer-
ences on the Federal Rules of Evidence, his accompanying book (the first to address 
the Rules), and his regular evidence articles in the New York Law Journal have been 
credited with introducing much of the legal, academic, and judicial community to 
the advent of the Rules. 
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view1 are definitely of that quality.  They have prompted in me a 
number of reflections, a few of which I have set forth below, concern-
ing two of the Articles—Christopher Slobogin’s2 and Eleanor Swift’s.3
These two Articles have much in common.  Each concentrates its 
fire on a particular evidentiary exclusionary rule when applied to bar 
pieces of a criminal defendant’s evidence of his state of mind.  Pro-
fessor Slobogin argues that the full Daubert4 scientific reliability rule 
should not apply to a criminal defendant’s expert psychological evi-
dence of his past mental state because such states are not susceptible 
of strict scientific proof.  Professor Swift deplores what she believes is 
a defense-evidence-restricting misinterpretation of the hearsay excep-
tion for defendant’s state of mind.5  Both base their arguments on 
the narrative or story-telling view of trials.6  Because juries are in the 
business of choosing among alternative, plausible stories of guilt and 
innocence, a criminal defendant should be able to tell, with some de-
gree of richness, his story of what unfolded and the kind of person he 
is.7  The authors allege these rules or rulings prevent a defendant 
from doing so. 
 1 Symposium, Guilt vs. Guiltiness: Are the Right Rules for Trying Factual Innocence In-
evitably the Wrong Rules for Trying Culpability?, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 885 (2008). 
 2 Christopher Slobogin, Experts, Mental States, and Acts, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1009 (2008). 
 3 Eleanor Swift, Narrative Theory, FRE 803(3), and Criminal Defendants’ Post-Crime 
State of Mind Hearsay, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 975 (2008). 
 4 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 5 The hearsay exception covering the declarant’s state of mind is codified in 
Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 803(3). 
 6 There are various iterations of the story-telling or narrative theory of trials, 
each with its own particular flavor.  See, e.g., ANTHONY AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, 
MINDING THE LAW 110–42 (2000); ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL (1999); 
REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 22–23, 163–64 
(1983); W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE 
COURTROOM (1981); John B. Mitchell, Evaluating Brady Error Using Narrative Theory: A 
Proposal for Reform, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 599 (2005); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black 
Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI L. REV. 511 (2004); Nancy 
Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991); Doron Menashe & Mutal E. Shamash, The Narrative 
Fallacy, 3 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE., Dec. 2005, at 6–8, http://www.bepress. 
com/ice/vol3/iss1/art3/.  Professors Slobogin and Swift are not necessarily wedded 
to any one of these, but their basic arguments stem from a general story-telling or 
narrative-theory foundation. 
 7 Justice Souter, writing for the majority in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 
183 (1997), endorsed the theory that at trial a story needs to be told with evidentiary 
or descriptive “richness.”  But in that case it was the prosecution’s need to do so that 
the court was speaking to protect.  The evidentiary or narrative richness theory was 
given by the Court as a reason to ordinarily refuse bare bones stipulations offered by 
the defense, although in Old Chief itself, the Court held that the stipulation, since it 
was one merely of status of being a convicted felon (in a possession-of-gun-by-
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Both Articles are finely nuanced contributions to the field and 
provide useful perspectives on some vexing problems.  But I think 
they both have implications that go well beyond the particular evi-
dentiary rules they address and well beyond evidence offered by a 
criminal defendant.  Further, they make some assumptions about 
what present evidentiary law provides, thereby underplaying possible 
alternative readings of that law.8
II. IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THEIR THESES 
I want to make clear that I am not faulting Professors Slobogin 
and Swift for the limits they have placed on their theses.  Authors 
have the right to compose the Article they want to write, not the Arti-
cle I want them to write.  They can treat whatever limited aspects of a 
potentially broader topic they desire.  Such a limited treatment can 
still be of considerable service to the rest of us, as the Slobogin and 
Swift Articles attest.  I am merely pointing out that the implications of 
their arguments go further than might initially appear.  Other au-
thors can begin where these two seminal Articles have left off. 
A. Implications Beyond Daubert and the State-of-Mind  
Hearsay Exception 
My point here can be made by a rhetorical question to both au-
thors: why concentrate your fire on just those two rules of evidence?  
Your logic—that criminal defendants ought to be able to paint a rich 
picture of who they are and what made them tick—suggests that you 
would want to reform other evidentiary rules that just as importantly 
restrict this picture: for example, the character rule (that may prevent 
showing what kind of person defendant or victim is or was)9 and the 
convicted-felon prosecution) did not on the facts of that case deprive the prosecu-
tion of any evidentiary or narrative richness. 
 8 My critique (not a criticism) of these Articles is based on attending their oral 
delivery at the Association of American Law Schools’ (AALS) conference (where I 
did voice some of my thoughts on the Articles) and reading a subsequent draft that 
thoughtfully took account of some of the points voiced at the AALS by the assembled 
group.  It is possible that there were further changes just before printing in the sym-
posium issue.  Nevertheless, the thrust of the Articles is doubtless the same, and my 
points herein are largely addressed to the general thrust and emphasis of the au-
thors.  My apologies if changes, unbeknownst to me, have blunted some of my points.  
Further, I am confining myself to these particular Articles of these authors, and do 
not get into their other also excellent, seminal, and prodigious publications. 
 9 For example, FRE 404(a), as read in the light of FRE 405(a), would not permit 
a criminal defendant to adduce some fairly powerful exculpatory picture-painting 
evidence, e.g., specific instances of (a) his own character of non-violence or other trait 
inconsistent with the crime charged, or (b) the victim’s past aggressive acts (to help 
prove current aggression) in a self defense case, unless the specific instances fit the 
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hearsay rule in general.10  In fact, Professor Slobogin specifically en-
dorses the character rule.11
Professor Swift admittedly does briefly acknowledge, near the 
end of her Article, that her view of story-telling might suggest other 
evidentiary reforms.  But most of her Article implicitly accepts that if 
a standard rule of evidence clearly and expressly provides for the ex-
clusion of a piece of defendant’s evidence, then so be it.  Her main 
proposition—a criticism of the cases engrafting a timeliness or trust-
worthiness requirement onto the state-of-mind hearsay exception 
(FRE 803(3)) when such a requirement is not there—plainly implies 
that if Rule 803(3) actually had the requirement written into it, then 
the requirement would be much more acceptable.  Her principle 
quarrel seems to be that courts have interpolated into the rule such a 
requirement (that works to the disadvantage of the criminal defen-
dant) when it is not actually in the rule’s text.  But wouldn’t the im-
pediment to story-telling be the same even if it were? 
Professor Slobogin goes even further in limiting his target to a 
particular evidentiary precept.  Not only does he fail to target defen-
dant-impacting rules or rulings other than Daubert, he specifically en-
dorses full Daubert restrictions on defendant’s psychological experts 
when they testify to traits indicating past conduct such as a non-
aggressive personality to prove non-assault (as opposed to past mental 
states like ignorance of right and wrong or irresistible impulse, which 
his thesis holds should not be subjected to full Daubert).12  Yet apply-
second sentence of Rule 404(b) (permitting other acts only under certain condi-
tions).  The story-telling theory extols the need of the jury to see the actors in the 
story as “human-like characters.”  See Swift, supra note 3, at 981 n.18. 
 10 It could be argued that hearsay has some reliability: that jurors are used to 
evaluating hearsay in daily life, e.g., when they hire a baby-sitter on neighborhood 
reputation or look at a clock (relying on the absent clock-setter); and that in many 
cases hearsay evidence may be the only way to fill in important details in the story de-
fendant is trying to tell. 
On a more direct note, Professor Swift’s criticism that courts are injecting an 
unwritten trustworthiness requirement into the state-of-mind hearsay exception, 
would seem also logically to apply to situations where the courts are inserting a trust-
worthiness requirement into other hearsay exceptions that do not have it.  See, for 
example, the general statement of the “requirements” of the excited utterance ex-
ception (FRE 803(2)) in the Third Circuit, set forth in U.S. v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454 
(3d Cir. 2001).  Several treatises indicate that, despite what may be deemed the bet-
ter view, a number of state and federal decisions disqualify statements from a wide 
range of hearsay exceptions, pursuant to a variety of rationales, if the statement 
seems untrustworthy or self-serving.  See infra notes 26, 30, and 36. 
 11 See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 2, at 1028 n.70.  
 12 In practice, this distinction may prove difficult to administer. 
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ing full Daubert in either instance could adversely impact the richness 
of defendant’s story. 
B. Implications Beyond the Criminal Defendant 
Further, both authors limit their argument to insuring a criminal 
defendant’s right to tell a rich story.13  What about civil parties?  And 
prosecutors?14  The story-telling theory embraces them as well. 
 13 Professor Swift writes as if the timeliness and trustworthiness qualifications on 
the state-of-mind hearsay exception only apply to bar a criminal defendant’s evi-
dence.  But surely, if there are such qualifications, they apply against civil defendants, 
civil plaintiffs, and prosecutors as well.  The exact piece of evidence Professor Swift 
addresses, which she thinks should be admissible, is a seemingly self-serving out-of-
court statement by a criminal defendant such as “I believe the property wasn’t stolen” 
when used in evidence by the defendant to suggest that the same state of mind (state 
of belief) was held by defendant at an earlier time when the property was possessed 
by defendant (the crime charged being knowingly possessing stolen property).  Pro-
fessor Swift decries rulings that bar the evidence by using essentially two grounds of 
exclusion, either separately or in combination: (1) timeliness—the state of mind be-
ing evidenced is past rather than contemporaneous with the statement (or, put an-
other way, the statement and state of mind it expresses are not contemporaneous 
with the crime); and (2) trustworthiness—the statement is not trustworthy (being so 
self-serving).  Although the occasions would admittedly be rarer, there are instances 
where the same two doctrines could exclude evidence of parties other than the 
criminal defendant.  For example, the prosecutor might want to use the exact reverse 
of the example statement (“I believe the property was stolen”) said by a partner of 
defendant to a friend and offered by the prosecution to help show defendant proba-
bly also knew.  If said by defendant, it would have an independent basis for admissi-
bility as a party admission.  Also, assume in my example that the partner is not un-
available, so it would not be a declaration against interest.  Or, for another example, 
suppose there is a civil case by O.J. Simpson against the purchaser, based on the re-
cent flap in which Simpson alleges that his sports memorabilia were stolen or de-
frauded from him and perhaps resold to a purchaser.  When O.J. sues this allegedly 
guilty possessor/purchaser for conversion and punitive damages, the latter might 
say, “What are you talking about?  I believe those memorabilia belonged to the 
dealer I bought them from.”  This statement might be offered by the civil defendant 
in order to establish status as an innocent, bona fide purchaser for value without no-
tice.  Further, in O.J.’s prosecution for his somewhat forceful efforts to get the 
memorabilia back, suppose he alleged the victim (purchaser) took measures to hide 
the memorabilia from him.  The same statement by the purchaser (victim) might be 
offered by the prosecution to rebut that there were evasive measures taken by the vic-
tim.  In each of these instances, though they do not involve evidence offered by the 
criminal defense, the doctrines deplored by Professor Swift might bar the evidence.  
(If the “trustworthiness” criterion is considered separately from the “timeliness” cri-
terion, it could be used to bar lots more evidence from all sorts of parties other than 
the criminal defendant, in myriads of situations.)  Professor Swift does not decry the 
two requirements as applied against these other parties, and she writes as if the re-
quirements are motivated by animus toward criminal defendants.  She may be right 
about this, but the case is not made that the requirements are not applied against 
others on facts equally implicating the timeliness and trustworthiness criteria.  Ad-
mittedly, it does seem that most of the occasions where the two doctrines would ap-
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Professor Slobogin does not ignore this issue.  He very briefly 
ventures a couple of intriguing reasons for so limiting his proposal 
and recognizes a few salient exceptions.  Towards the end of her Arti-
cle, Professor Swift acknowledges but does not endorse the possibility 
of a less rule-bound evidentiary system apparently in the interests of 
story-telling by everyone in the trial.  But the thrust of both Articles is 
to guarantee the criminal defendant’s right to tell his story.  The story-
telling model itself is not so limited. 
Personally, I agree that the criminal defendant has the greatest 
claim to broadened admissibility to tell a richer story, but the reasons 
why are not self-evident.  They require more support and discussion if 
anyone not of my persuasion is to be convinced.  Admittedly, the 
Symposium that Slobogin and Swift are writing for is entitled Guilt vs. 
Guiltiness and obviously is confined to the subject of criminal defen-
dants.  So, I emphasize again, I do not fault the authors for limiting 
their theses.  I am merely underlining that there are greater implica-
tions. 
III. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT WHAT CURRENT LAW PROVIDES 
Both Articles make some assumptions about current law.  While 
this may be justifiable, I would like to clarify that theirs are not the 
only possible readings of current law. 
ply in combination to bar evidence would involve evidence tending to exculpate a 
criminal defendant. 
Regarding the Slobogin Article, I am not convinced that the prosecutor is not 
equally handicapped by the application of full Daubert to past-state-of-mind evidence; 
or that there are not as many pressing issues concerning past state of mind in civil 
cases on both sides.  All the intentional torts involve intention (much like crimes), 
and also many jurisdictions have versions of tort insanity defenses (although they are 
not always identical to the criminal defense).  Past state of mind can be very impor-
tant in negligence cases as well.  The very concept of negligence has many state-of-
mind aspects; and in addition, in many jurisdictions there are special allowances 
made in negligence cases for various mental impairments or handicaps, particularly, 
but not only, in the contexts of contributory or comparative negligence.  In cases in-
volving children, tort law often requires the jury to compare the child’s actions to 
those of a child of “like age, intelligence, experience, and maturity” or other similar 
standard.  This requires evidence of some very subjective matters.  Further, the con-
cepts of aggravated negligence, degrees of negligence, last clear chance, and assump-
tion of risk (which requires voluntariness and knowledge of the risk) involve past 
mental state.  The torts of infliction of mental distress undeniably have difficult issues 
of past mental state both before and after the infliction of the tort.  The damages for 
almost all torts can include mental and emotional damages.  Causation often in-
cludes mental-state evidence.  Finally, in many tort cases, the issue of punitive dam-
ages engenders its own inquiry into past state of mind. 
 14 Professor Swift hints that Old Chief may take care of the problem for prosecu-
tors.  But, of course, Old Chief does not relax any rules of evidence. 
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A. Professor Slobogin on the  Daubert Test for Admission of Scientific 
Evidence 
Professor Slobogin makes the very sensible suggestion that a full-
blown Daubert inquiry is inappropriate on certain “softer” psychologi-
cal evidence—that which relates to the defendant’s past state of 
mind.  Such evidence, he rightly says, could not survive a strict 
Daubert analysis because rigorous studies to support this kind of evi-
dence would be very hard to come by.  Yet he recognizes, again per-
ceptively, that the evidence might be quite useful and important in 
giving the jury the full picture of the alleged criminal, his act, and its 
accompanying mental state.  Slobogin proposes a new test for such 
evidence, which he calls in short-hand “Daubert-lite.”15 He describes it 
more extensively as follows: 
I propose[] . . . the “generally accepted content validity” test, 
which consists of two parts, general acceptance and content valid-
ity.  The general acceptance concept is well-known to lawyers be-
cause it comes from . . . Frye . . . .  Expert testimony passes the Frye 
test if it is based on theories and methodology accepted by most 
or many practitioners in the relevant field.  Content validity is a 
concept well-known to social scientists.  It is to be distinguished 
from criterion validity and construct validity, both of which are 
also means of measuring accuracy.  Criterion validity requires hav-
ing objective criteria against which to measure a finding, and con-
struct validity requires identifying a valid outcome measure of 
constructs . . . so that comparisons can be made.  Because . . . 
good criteria and comparable outcomes are not readily available 
for past mental state findings, content validity is probably the best 
we can do for now in this setting.  Content validity asks whether 
the content of an assessment looks like it addresses the relevant is-
sues. 
 So, in combination, “generally accepted” “content validity” re-
quires that expert testimony assess factors that knowledgeable and 
experienced experts in the field consider important in the type of 
 15 Critics will undoubtedly point out that there is something wrong with saying 
that when evidence cannot meet reliability standards then courts should lower the 
standards.  They will say that this is reminiscent of the argument that military tribu-
nals are needed because one cannot get convictions of terror suspects if the normal 
rules of evidence are applicable—an argument made frequently in current times.  I 
am not necessarily in agreement with these critics.  But perhaps there is something 
overlooked by Professor Slobogin’s proposal.  It is that juries may think experts are 
extremely reliable and may not realize that there are two tiers of psychological ex-
perts: those that testify to things that are susceptible to rigorous verification, and 
those that are not.  Perhaps a jury instruction could take care of this.  But then, crit-
ics might ask, why have the latter experts at all?  Professor Slobogin would say they 
are better than no experts. 
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case at issue.  In practical effect, it would require that experts 
evaluating mental state at the time of the offense use standardized 
interview protocols similar to those developed in related evalua-
tion settings.16
Thus, Professor Slobogin assumes that, under current law, the 
rigorous Daubert reliability test would bar the valuable soft psycho-
logical evidence he identifies, and a new “Daubert-lite” approach is 
necessary. 
But it may well be that a new Daubert-lite test is not needed.  The 
law already has a test that, with proper argument, could be applied to 
this evidence with effect similar to Slobogin’s.  Instead of Daubert-lite, 
the test is called Kumho.17  Kumho states: 
Federal Rules [of Evidence] 702 and 703 grant expert witnesses 
testimonial latitude . . . on the “assumption that the expert’s opin-
ion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of 
his discipline” [quoting Daubert] . . . .  There are many different 
kinds of experts and many different kinds of expertise . . . .  [The 
inquiry] is a flexible one . . . .  We agree . . . that “the factors iden-
tified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliabil-
ity, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular 
expertise, and the subject of the testimony” [quoting the brief of 
the Solicitor General]. . . .  [I]t will at times be useful to ask even 
of a witness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say a 
perfume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff, 
whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field would 
recognize as acceptable. . . .  [The] gatekeeping requirement is to 
make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon pro-
fessional studies or personal experience, employs in the court-
 16 Slobogin, supra note 2, at 1019.  Shortly after Daubert but prior to Kumho Tire 
Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), we made a  suggestion looking in a 
somewhat similar “Daubert-lite” direction: 
The applicability of Daubert to social science evidence is unclear . . . .  
Probably a sensible view is to view Daubert as holding that if evidence 
purports to be scientific, it had better live up to that appellation . . . . 
[But] evidence that promises less need deliver less. . . .  In other words, 
only the degree of rigor expected of the expert . . . in his or her own 
field [would be] required.  Different areas of human endeavor may 
have standards analogous to, but less rigorous than “the scientific 
method” (which latter method they could not fairly be expected to live 
up to).  Yet they may still have something to contribute to a trial. . . .  
Requirements of admissibility should be tailored accordingly. 
PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, MYRNA S. RAEDER & DAVID CRUMP, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 364–65 
(3d ed. 1997) (owing to the subsequent decision of Kumho, with which it was some-
what redundant, this passage was deleted by the time of the book’s present 5th ed. 
2007). 
 17 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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room the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the 
practice of an expert in the relevant field.18
This sounds very like the “generally accepted content validity” 
test of Professor Slobogin, or at least might accommodate it.  The 
Kumho test could amount to Slobogin’s Daubert-lite when applied to 
expert testimony on topics—like past mental state—that are not sus-
ceptible to a strict or literal application of the Daubert factors of reli-
ability.  In my view, the primary value of Professor Slobogin’s article is 
that it powerfully and cogently points the way to how Kumho could be 
applied to psychological, past mental state evidence. 
B. Professor Swift on FRE 803(3): The State-of-Mind  
Hearsay Exception 
Professor Swift takes aim at the exclusionary rulings in cases that 
are all essentially variations of the following fact pattern: defendant in 
a criminal case is charged with a crime that involved guilty knowledge 
at the time of the commission of the crime.  For example, defendant 
might be charged with the crime of reselling goods known by him to 
have been stolen by a third-party.  When approached by the police af-
ter his resale, the defendant says, “What’s the big deal? These goods 
are perfectly legitimate.”  At trial, defendant proffers that he said this, 
as evidence that he did not know the goods were stolen at the time he 
was caught.  He hopes the jury will infer that if he indeed thought the 
goods were legitimate when he made the statement, i.e., when he was 
caught,, then (1) he did not know they were stolen at that time, and 
(2) that same ignorance probably existed at the earlier time as well, 
i.e., when he resold the goods. 
In Professor Swift’s examples, real-case decisions which she criti-
cizes, the court holds defendant-statements, like the one above, in-
admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) (state-of-mind 
hearsay exception) or analogous state rules, because of requirements 
that she believes the courts are injecting into the rule, requirements 
that are unsupported by its text or intent.  They are as follows: (1) a 
requirement that the statement must have been made at the time of 
the reselling, reflecting an ignorant state of mind at that time (a 
“timeliness” requirement); and (2) a requirement that the statement 
be trustworthy, which it is not because it is so self-serving (a “trustwor-
thiness” requirement). 
I am in total agreement with Professor Swift that it would be bet-
ter policy if juries got to hear the statement and decide for them-
 18 Id. at 148–52. 
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selves whether it is credible and what it means in terms of the overall 
story.  Further, I am grateful to her for bringing this problem to light.  
That is an enormous service.  But I think the courts’ application of 
the timeliness and trustworthiness requirements to exclude are not as 
legally off-base or unsupported by law as Professor Swift contends (al-
though I wish it were).  Let’s examine the two requirements. 
i. Timeliness 
Rule 803(3) (state-of-mind hearsay exception) on its face and 
pursuant to its drafting history and commentary requires that the 
“state of mind” being reported by declarant in the offered out-of-
court statement (here, the state of mind of ignorance of the stolen 
nature of the goods) be contemporaneous with the statement of it.  
Everyone agrees this is required by the rule. 19  Swift, however, be-
lieves this requirement is satisfied in our reselling stolen property 
case because (assuming the jury believes it) the statement is concur-
rent with the ignorance the statement reports.  The inference back-
ward, that the same state of mind (ignorance) was held when the de-
fendant resold the goods, is just that—an inference.  It is not 
something that the jury is asked to believe because the statement said 
it (i.e., said he had that state of mind at the time of the reselling).  
The statement did not say that.  It is only an inference.  Therefore, 
Professor Swift reasons, the timeliness requirement in the rule is met 
and the statement should be admissible, contrary to the holdings of 
the courts she criticizes. 
But Professor Swift’s way is not the only way to look at the mat-
ter.  There are at least two other rationales that would justify the re-
sult reached by these courts—that timeliness is violated. 
First, it is clear that if the defendant said, when caught, not that 
he currently believed the goods were legitimate, but rather that he be-
lieved when he resold them that they were legitimate, even Professor Swift 
agrees that that statement would not be within the hearsay exception 
and therefore would be inadmissible.20  This is because the rule ex-
pressly excludes “statement[s] of memory or belief [offered] to prove 
 19 See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 570–71 (3d ed. 2008). 
 20 One may query why Professor Swift does not object to this exclusion of evi-
dence.  This statement would seem to be as necessary to defendant’s story as the 
other statement.  For example, one reason she gives as to why the other statement 
should come in is that the jury may wonder why nothing was said if the defendant be-
lieved the goods were not stolen.  The same could also be said about this statement.  
In fact, the same could be said for any number of matters of defense that might be 
excluded by any number of rules of evidence. 
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the fact remembered or believed.”21  Might not the statement defen-
dant actually made when caught (“I believe the goods are legitimate”) 
be viewed as an implied statement that “I believed at the time of the resale 
that the goods were legitimate”? (By legitimate we mean un-stolen.) An 
implied statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801 is whatever 
the declarant meant to convey.22  It is not a great stretch to find that a 
“caught” defendant, when he says he thinks the goods are legitimate 
means to convey (perhaps cleverly) that he thought they were legiti-
mate when he was handling them.  At least a judge could so find and 
FRE 104 entrusts this finding to the trial judge.23  Perhaps, in an im-
precise way, this is what the judges that Professor Swift excoriates are 
doing. 
A second way to look at the matter, also justifying those judges, 
would be to recognize that the defendant’s statement comes within 
the principle that a statement of currently existing state of mind can-
not be used if its only relevance is to reflect or indicate the existence 
of some past fact (here, the past state of mind).24  Again, in an impre-
cise way, this may be what the judges are saying in Professor Swift’s 
examples. 
Both of these alternate ways of justifying the exclusionary ruling 
are in accord with the general underlying justification for the state-of-
mind hearsay exception and its concurrency requirement: that while 
one has peculiar access to (and is unlikely to be mistaken about) 
one’s present state of mind, the same cannot be said about state-
ments reflecting past states of mind or fact from which one is re-
moved in space and/or time and which are therefore susceptible to 
errors of memory and/or perception.25
 21 FED R. EVID. 803(3). 
 22 “A ‘statement’ [for purposes of the hearsay rule] is (1) an oral or written asser-
tion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an asser-
tion.”  FED R. EVID. 801(a).  The Advisory Committee Note to this provision could be 
read to suggest that this intention test applies to implying one assertion from an-
other, as well as from nonverbal conduct.  See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 19, at 511–12. 
 23 This is a Rule 104(a) determination not a Rule 104(b) determination.  See 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 19, at 512.  Cf. ROTHSTEIN, RAEDER & CRUMP, supra note 16, at 
394–96. 
 24 ROTHSTEIN, RAEDER & CRUMP, supra note 16, at 513; United States v. Sama-
niego, 345 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (an interesting case involving the noted boxer, 
Roberto Duran, whose real name is Samaniego). 
 25 See ROTHSTEIN, RAEDER & CRUMP, supra note 16, at 511.  Because of such poten-
tial for error when the state-of-mind evidence is offered to reflect something that was 
past, Rule 403 might be invoked for exclusion as well.   
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ii. Trustworthiness 
A number of the courts criticized by Professor Swift exclude the 
statement on grounds of trustworthiness.  The statement is said to be 
self-serving and therefore remarkably untrustworthy.  Professor Swift 
says there is no trustworthiness requirement in the state-of-mind 
hearsay exception contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), as 
there is in other hearsay exceptions contained within the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.26  She says that when there is no trustworthiness 
requirement in a hearsay exception, trustworthiness is assumed.27
But conclusively assumed?  What about Federal Rule of Evidence 
403, allowing judges to weigh the probative value of a piece of evi-
dence against countervailing factors such as misleadingness, time 
consumption, prejudice, and the like?  Rule 403 is the “great over-
ride,” meaning that it can be applied in the judge’s discretion to rule 
out almost any evidence, even if another rule seems to say the evi-
 26 That is, the hearsay exceptions for business records (FRE 803(6)), public re-
cords (FRE 803(8)), declarations against interest (FRE 804(b)(3) containing an 
“against interest” requirement and in some situations a corroboration requirement), 
and the catch-all or residual exception (FRE 807). 
What Professor Swift might have overlooked, however, is that at common law 
and continued in the law of a number of states today, and even in some federal 
courts, there is a judicially imposed requirement for many hearsay exceptions that 
there be no motive to fabricate.  See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454 (3d 
Cir. 2001); see 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1732, at 
159–60 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1976); infra notes 30 and 36. 
 27 It is not clear that all courts would agree with this.  Further, as a matter of gen-
eral legal theory, it is usually an acceptable argument that if the underlying rationale 
behind some legal category (here, that a particular category of evidence is trustwor-
thy) is not satisfied in a particular case, then the category need not be applied.  In-
deed, when I was advising Congress concerning the alteration and adoption of the 
Supreme Court draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it became clear to me that 
many members of congress were under the impression that trustworthiness is a fac-
tual issue in every case under all the hearsay exceptions.  It does seem to me person-
ally, however, as it seems to Professor Swift, that this flouts the whole “category” the-
ory of hearsay exceptions and is inconsistent with the fact that some hearsay 
exceptions have a trustworthiness requirement and some do not, and that a specific 
trustworthiness provision in the earlier Uniform Rules was rejected by the drafters of 
the Federal Rules.  However, our personal perceptions on this are not universal.  
Specific trustworthiness provisions in certain hearsay exceptions may be explained 
on the illogical but practical grounds that the drafters wanted to accommodate, or 
call attention to, particular disqualifying matters from the case law,such as (in busi-
ness records) the Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1953), problem (self-serving busi-
ness records offered in own behalf) and the Johnson v. Lutz, 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930), 
problem (information supplied by outsiders), which can have permutations that defy 
specific codification.   
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dence is admissible.28  In particular, Rule 403 applies to evidence ad-
missible under exceptions to the hearsay rule.29  Would it not be 
proper for a judge to consider, pursuant to Rule 403, the trustwor-
thiness of the declarant’s statement in the case we are examining, 
and for the judge to conclude that the statement is so self-serving as 
to be almost worthless from a probative value standpoint—so that its 
reception into evidence would be unduly time consuming and mis-
leading?30  Perhaps, in an inarticulate way, this is what the judges 
criticized by Professor Swift are doing.31
 28 See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, MYRNA S. RAEDER & DAVID CRUMP, EVIDENCE: CASES, 
MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 57 (3d ed. 2006).  An exception to this may be made where 
the other rule seems to expressly so provide.  See, e.g., FRE 609(a)(2). 
 29 See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note; ROTHSTEIN, RAEDER & CRUMP, 
supra note 28, at 466–68. 
 30 McCormick recognizes that FRE 403 can and is used in this fashion under 
hearsay exceptions.  See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 270, 274 at 248–49, 267–68 n.8 
(Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (“Circumstantial or direct evidence revealing a 
self-serving motive should logically have a place” under a judge’s Rule 403 computa-
tion as applied to any evidence including statements coming within hearsay excep-
tions; and with relation to our 803(3) statements specifically, “[i]t is through [Rule 
403] that the self serving nature of the statement . . . may provide a basis for exclu-
sion.”).  Other treatises are to similar effect.  For example, surveying current case 
law, Weinstein states that to satisfy Rule 803(3) “[t]here must be no suspicious cir-
cumstances suggesting a motive for the declarant to fabricate or misrepresent his or 
her thoughts.”  5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS § 
803.05(2)(a), at 803–29 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008); see also 
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.38, at 819 (3d ed. 
2003).  These books acknowledge conflicting decisions on both sides of the divide 
even as regards this particular hearsay exception.  All of them are somewhat equivo-
cal concerning their own preferred view. 
Older treatises are similar.  See, e.g., 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S 
EVIDENCE & 803(3)[04] (1990); 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 441, 442, at 538–39, 551–53 (1980). 
The material in McCormick is ambivalent about whether the author personally 
approves of the use of Rule 403 to appraise trustworthiness in all cases under hearsay 
exceptions.  The author generally approves such use but raises a question about it 
when the evidence is crucial or the jury is as capable of assessing the issue as the 
judge. 
The McCormick material also states an additional ground for exclusion of the 
statements we are dealing with: that the passage of time combined with arrest and 
consultation with counsel may render the statement irrelevant because the usual pre-
sumption that an expressed, concurrently held state of mind continued backward to 
the time of the crime would not apply in that situation.  This ground, which endorses 
both the timeliness and the trustworthiness arguments, might be the subject for an-
other article. 
 31 It is interesting to note that in United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 
1984), the one case Professor Swift cites as a laudable maverick (in that it admits the 
evidence), the evidence on the facts is much more trustworthy than in the others.  
This kind of factual discrimination is characteristic of Rule 403-type rulings. 
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In answer, Professor Swift would characterize this trustworthiness 
computation as a credibility determination.  She would then point to 
cases that say credibility of a witness is not to be considered by the 
judge under Rule 403 and should be left to the jury.32  She would say 
that the same principle should be applied to the credibility of a decla-
rant whose statement is admitted under a hearsay exception.33
Admittedly, I with co-authors, have argued that credibility of wit-
nesses is primarily a jury function in our system, and that Rule 403 
computations should proceed on the assumption that the witness is 
telling the truth—that the judge under Rule 403 should merely weigh 
the strength, deceptiveness, prejudice, and worth of the inferences to 
be drawn from what the witness is saying, as if it were true.34
However, jurors have less ability to gauge the credibility of an ab-
sent declarant, which we have here, than of a witness who appears be-
fore them.  And, in contrast to a judge, jurors have little experience 
in the mendacity of defendants when they are caught red-handed. 
 32 See Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147 (1981). 
 33 In addition to DiMaria, she cites some commentators to this effect, although 
they each reflect there is a division of authority and are somewhat equivocal about 
their own preference. 
 34 ROTHSTEIN, RAEDER & CRUMP, supra note 28, at 8–9 nn.7–8, states the following:  
Personal credibility of witnesses . . . is almost always considered some-
thing we trust jurors to be able to gauge properly . . . .  The idea is that 
reasonable people can almost always disagree over whether a witness is 
believable.  In our jury system, facts that reasonable people could dis-
agree over are for the jury.  The upshot of this is that ordinarily, the 
balancing of relevance or probative value against the counterweights 
like prejudice, misleadingness, and time consumption, which the judge 
is to perform in order to decide admissibility, in most cases must be 
done assuming the evidence is true . . . . [T]he question of how credi-
ble the witness is should not figure into the probative value side of the 
equation.  In other words, the balancing should be done by the judge 
based on the assumption the witness is telling the truth.  Thus the only 
thing that is weighed is whether, assuming the witness is telling the 
truth, the inference arises strongly enough to outweigh the negative 
counterweights.  [There are cases that dissent from this.] 
The authors also raise a question as to whether some courts are merely paying lip-
service to this notion. 
Anyway, what Professor Swift and I are talking about in these Articles is a matter 
of what inference should be drawn from the statement, and should not be classified 
as merely a matter of credibility.  Because it is a matter of whether the inference can 
be drawn reliably (probative value) and without exaggeration (prejudice or mislead-
ingness), it is squarely within Rule 403. 
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More importantly, a number of courts seem to believe that gaug-
ing credibility, even of witnesses, is not excluded from the judge’s bal-
ancing under Rule 403.35
Bottom line, while I agree that as a policy matter it would be 
preferable in our example for jurors to hear the defendant’s state-
ment of ignorance and draw their own conclusions as to self-
servingness, I do not think the decisions Professor Swift criticizes are 
as off-base or out of step with the law as she suggests.  In my view, she 
will have to procure an amendment of the written rule in order to in-
sure the result we both want, which is to preclude the judges’ discre-
tion to exclude in these cases.  This is because existing principles of 
law, on one defensible reading, can be properly deployed to support 
judicial consideration of the trustworthiness of the statement or to 
justify the timeliness requirement.36  Nevertheless, Professor Swift has 
 35 See, e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1984) (uncorrobo-
rated testimony of an accomplice offered to establish an “other crime” under the 
permissible purposes clause of FRE 404(b) was not very credible; therefore, the 
“other crime” was inadmissible).  See also United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 
(4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983).  This was the case dramatized in 
Fatal Visions.  It excluded under Rule 403, as not very credible, numerous extra-
judicial statements of someone other than defendant, that suggested, exactly as de-
fendant had alleged, that a third party rather than defendant committed the killing.  
The defendant was ultimately convicted.  This seems like a prime candidate for Pro-
fessor Swift’s cross hairs if she did not limit herself to the hearsay exception for state 
of mind.  See also United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that 
the “convincingness of the evidence that the other crimes were committed and that 
the accused was the actor” is one of the factors to be considered in whether the 
“other crime” is admissible); Drackett Products v. Blue, 152 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1963) 
(statement on stand by personal injury plaintiff that she would not have stored drain 
cleaner where it could get wet if she had been warned on the label that it might ex-
plode from water was excluded as too self-serving).  
It may be that gauging credibility under Rule 403 is more defensible in some ar-
eas, such as the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, pursuant to Rule 
404(b), than in others.  Perhaps the potential for prejudice from the evidence 
should be a factor.  But that is a subject for another article. 
It might be painting with too broad a brush to speak of “credibility” as a discreet 
issue.  Rolled up within the concept of credibility are a number of different infer-
ences, depending on the situation.  There are many reasons for “incredibility” and a 
number of different ways in which something can be incredible.  We mean different 
things by ”incredible” in different situations.  The jury may be the appropriate ap-
praiser of some of these issues and not others.  But once again, this is not the proper 
time or place to treat this. 
 36 For example, the Weinstein treatise summarizes current case law thusly: to sat-
isfy Rule 803(3) “[t]here must be no suspicious circumstances suggesting a motive 
for the declarant to fabricate or misrepresent his or her thoughts.”  5 WEINSTEIN & 
BERGER, supra note 30, § 803.05(2)(a), at 803–29.  See also 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 
30, §§ 270, 274, at 248–49, 267–68 n.8; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 8.38, 
at 819.  These treatises acknowledge conflicting decisions on both sides of the divi-
sion of authority, equivocating about their own preferences. 
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focused us on an important problem and has pointed the way to solv-
ing it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Articles of Professors Swift and Slobogin are truly seminal 
articles, setting the stage for continuing discussions and, hopefully, 
eventual law reform.  These two scholars have once again given us 
important food for thought, and I look forward to more from them 
in the future and from the many other scholars whom they have 
doubtlessly inspired. 
